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Abstract 
 
We show that, in competition between a developed country and a developing country over 
environmental standards and taxes, the developing country may have a ‘second-mover 
advantage.’ In our model, firms do not unanimously prefer lower environmental-standard 
levels. We introduce this feature to an otherwise familiar model of fiscal competition. Four 
distinct outcomes can be characterized by varying the marginal cost to firms of an 
environmental externality: (1) the outcome may be efficient; (2) the developing country may 
be a ‘pollution haven’ - a place to escape excessively high environmental standards in the 
developed country; (3) the developing country may ‘undercut’ the developed country and 
attract all firms; (4) the developed country may be a pollution haven. 
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1 Introduction
The recent integration of countries in Eastern Europe to the European Union (EU) has
provoked renewed concern about the aggressive competition by new members for firms and
other mobile factors. For example, although EU accession requirements demand moves
towards harmonization of environmental standards and some measures have made it onto
statute books, there appears to be widespread skepticism about the actual implementation
of such measures. Citing the incentive to keep standards low in order to attract firms, Post
(2002) states that “there is a ‘deception gap’ between what is said on paper and what is
done in practice” with regard to environmental policy.4
The main purpose of this paper is to show that, through competition in ESs and taxes, a
developing/transition country may have a ‘second-mover advantage’ over a developed country
in attracting firms and extracting rents but not necessarily through the expected channels
of low taxes and environmental standards (ESs). While this concern has circulated in policy
discussions for some time now, to our knowledge it has not been studied formally before in
the literature on fiscal competition.
To investigate this concern, our paper develops a model of international competition over
ESs and taxes. We will first set out a brief explanation of the model, which will be expanded
upon in the paragraphs that follow. There are two countries, one developed and the other
developing. There are four firms in the model, one immobile firm in each country and two
that are mobile. Mobile firms who locate in a country are required to pay a tax that is
used, at least in part, to monitor (and enforce) the ES in that country. Due to monitoring
costs, the higher the standard set by a country the more costly it is to implement. The
production technology of one of the mobile firms is more polluting than the other. The two
immobile firms are more polluting still so, in addition to lowering taxes, governments can
compete over ESs to improve the environment in a bid to attract the mobile firms.5 The
developed country government sets its ES and tax first, followed by the developing country
government. Government objectives are purely to maximize revenues. A key parameter in
the model is the ‘marginal cost of the pollution externality’ (mcpe) which parameterizes how
4Andanova (2003) provides further details of environmental policy in Eastern Europe.
5We are more used to the suggestion that footloose firms are drawn to the lowest environmental standards.
However, there appears to be evidence that this is not universally the case; firms that are internationally
mobile are in some cases more productive through their use of more eﬃcient and hence cleaner technologies
than domestic firms and hence are attracted to higher environmental standards rather than lower ones
(Graham 2000).
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a given pollution level aﬀects a firm’s costs of production. Each firm chooses its location to
maximize profits, taking as given the tax levels and ESs in the two countries as well as the
pollution levels of the other firms that locate there.
The issue of competition over ESs and taxes has been raised particularly with respect
to the more economically successful ‘transition countries’ from the former Soviet Union
as well as, to a lesser extent, the ‘emerging market’ developing countries in Asia and the
Middle East. The so-called ‘Visegrad countries’ of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland
and Slovakia (V4 for short) exemplify the developing and transition countries that we have
in mind. These countries are in the midsts of comprehensive governmental reforms, and
arguably their governments have a greater degree of flexibility and fewer constitutional and
institutional constraints than the long-established democracies in the core of Europe. The
same reasoning may also be used to explain the greater flexibility of dictatorships and young
democracies further afield. For brevity, throughout the paper we will use ‘developing country’
as a catch-all term for such countries.6 We capture this greater flexibility in policy-making by
developing countries, as a result of which they can respond (within the period of a parliament
say) to policies adopted by developed countries, through our specification of timing in the
game of policy formation. In our two-country model, we will assume that the developed
country sets its standard and tax first, followed by the developing country.
In contrast to the past literature (summarized below), we focus on a situation where
the tax base is not universally repelled by, nor universally attracted to, ESs. Consider the
familiar textbook example where firms need water as an input to production and so must
locate around a lake. The assumption that production in one of the mobile firms has a lower
propensity to generate pollution than production in the other could be interpreted in one
of two ways. In one scenario, both firms are from the same industry but one is newer than
the other and, using more eﬃcient technology, pollutes the water in the lake by less per unit
of output. In a second scenario, each firm is from a diﬀerent industry that has a diﬀerent
propensity to generate pollution. In any case we will refer to the firm that generates less
6It should be understood that we are excluding from consideration a significant group of transition
countries and less developed countries whose economic performances remain poor, not least because their
policy-making processes are bogged down in a quagmire of distributional and special-interest concerns.
The World Bank’s (1996) World Development Report focuses specifically on a comparison in economic
performance of the transition economies, grouping the twenty-six countries by numbers 1-4, with the top-
performing V4 countries in group 1, etc. Specific details substantiating the distinction we make between
governments in transition countries are provided in Chapter 7 of World Bank (1996), which focuses on
government and policy formation; see especially pages 113-115.
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pollution as the ‘clean’ firm and the other one as the ‘dirty’ firm. The pollution emitted by
the dirty firm reduces the profits of the clean firm more than vice versa. If they both locate
in the same country (and around the same lake), an ES that requires all firms to reduce
their pollution will improve the profits of the clean firm while the eﬀect on the profits of the
dirty one is ambiguous.
Our simple framework yields a surprisingly rich set of equilibrium predictions. There are
four possible sorts of outcome which can be characterized as follows. (a) If the mcpe is low
and the mobile firms are similar in their pollution levels then fiscal competition leads to an
eﬃcient equilibrium outcome (as in Brennan and Buchanan’s 1980 model of tax competition).
(b) If the mcpe is low but the mobile firms diﬀer to a greater degree in their pollution levels
then the developed country may set its ES ineﬃciently high, in which case the developing
country becomes a pollution haven; a place where the dirty firm locates in order to escape
the high ES set in the developed country. (c) If the mcpe is high and the mobile firms
are similar in their pollution levels then the developing country is able to undercut the
developed country, with both firms locating in the developing country. (d) If the mcpe
is high and the mobile firms diﬀer to a greater degree in their pollution levels then the
developed country becomes the pollution haven, where the dirty firm locates to escape a (not
necessarily ineﬃciently) high ES set by the developing country. It is especially interesting
that ineﬃciently high standards can arise in equilibrium, either in the developed country (as
in b) or in the developing country (as in c and d) purely through strategic interaction between
governments in their competition for firms and not as a result of attempts by governments
to reduce emissions on behalf of consumers/citizens.7
The key strategic consideration that drives our results is that the developed country
wants to bring about an outcome in which the developing country is prepared to ‘share’
the mobile firms rather than undercut the developed country and attract them both. To
do so, the developed country must put the developing country in a situation where it can
earn higher rents by sharing firms than by undercutting. Intuitively, sharing is particularly
7The issue of governments setting environmental standards too high, in order to dissuade a noxious
production facility from locating in their jurisdictions, is referred to as ‘not in my back yard’ or NIMBY, and
brings about a ‘race to the top’. NIMBY has been studied by Levinson (1999) among others. Conversely,
Kempf and Rossignol (2007) study a situation where voters object to a higher burden from environmental
policy being placed on the industry where they work relative to other industries if this adversely aﬀects
their welfare, say through employment. In our framework governments do not repel firms in response to
environmental concerns by consumers nor other parties who may be harmed by the hosting of firms. Yet we
can get overprovision or underprovision of the ES through a quite diﬀerent set of interactions.
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beneficial for the developing country if it attracts the clean firm and leaves the dirty firm
to the developed country. There are two reasons to think this. The first is simply that the
clean firm is cheaper to monitor since it has a lower incentive to deviate from the ES. The
second more interesting eﬀect is that the clean firm is less elastic in its location decision than
the dirty firm; to avoid the relatively large externality exerted by the dirty firm it prefers
to locate in the other country, and this creates extra rent that the government can extract
from the clean firm through higher taxation.8
From this perspective, the most surprising equilibrium outcome is actually case (b) where
the developing country becomes a pollution haven, setting the minimum ES and attracting
the dirty firm. In this case the developed country can make sharing firms attractive for the
developing country by setting its ES at a high level and attracting the clean firm; at a low
mcpe, this high ES level makes the developed country unattractive to the relatively noxious
dirty firm. Consequently, the developing country can set the minimum ES and a relatively
high tax and still attract it.
Standard international trade theory provides a diﬀerent rationale for the existence of
pollution havens, based on the argument that lax ESs are a source of comparative advantage
since they lower the opportunity cost of pollution. However, the empirical evidence for this
motivation for pollution havens is mixed (see Antweiler, Copeland and Taylor 2001, Taylor
2004, and Ederington, Levinson and Minier 2004). Therefore, our case (b) is helpful in
that it presents an alternative strategic motivation for the existence of pollution havens in
developing countries based on their second-mover advantage.
An interesting feature of equilibrium in our model is that the developing country practices
limit-taxing by setting a tax just low enough to attract the firm(s) that it wishes to attract.
The developing country’s power to extract rents through limit-taxing arises solely through its
second-mover advantage. This contrasts with the prior literature, exemplified by Markusen,
Morey and Olewiler (1995) and Baldwin and Krugman (2004), in which it is the developed
country that has a first-mover advantage derived from its power to act as a limit-pricing
monopolist because at the outset firms are located there and have an ‘attachment to home.’
8One objection might be that developing countries typically set relatively low taxes as well as ESs whereas
in our model the tax set by developing countries can be relatively high. A simple ‘fix’ to our model which
would enable the developed country to set higher taxes would be to initially locate the mobile firms in the
developed country and give them an attachment to home. This would enable us to control relative taxation
across countries by varying the ‘attachment to home’ parameter. The reason we didn’t adopt this fix was
because, while the outcome would have been more realistic, the workings of the model would have been made
less transparent. Other possible modifications to the model are discussed in the concluding section.
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Broadly, the prior literature on interjurisdictional competition over ESs and taxes can be
categorized into two areas. The first area, following Tiebout (1956), focuses on situations
where competition among independent governments is like competition among firms and
enhances eﬃciency. The ‘Tiebout assumption’ is that all firms benefit to diﬀering degrees
from a clean environment and sort themselves eﬃciently into jurisdictions each of which
enforces an ES that is appropriate for its members. The second area concerns the presence
of a policy-failure that allows or induces governments to set taxes on mobile capital, as in the
literature on fiscal federalism and ‘standard tax competition’ associated with Oates (1972),
Wilson (1986) and Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986). Capital is indiﬀerent to the imposition
of an ES, but is repelled if burdened with having to pay for the ES. In these situations
local jurisdictions, while competing for mobile capital, at the same time tax that capital
to protect the environment. (In this literature, the terms ‘environmental standard’ and
‘environmental regulation’ are used interchangeably; see Wilson 1996 and Levinson 2003
for surveys.) Our model combines features of models from papers in both areas: on the
one hand firms diﬀer in the degree to which they benefit from a clean environment and
competition between governments introduces eﬃciency-enhancing incentives; on the other
hand the broader environment in which these incentives operate is one of market - or policy
- failures that preclude the attainment of a fully eﬃcient equilibrium.
As far as we are aware, the situation that we examine here in which firms inflict pol-
lution externalities on each other has not previously been studied in the context of fiscal
competition. And the issue of developing country second-mover advantage has not formally
been motivated. The model is of course highly stylized. Nevertheless, the results seem intu-
itively plausible and may be indicative of more general strategic interactions over taxes and
environmental policy that have aroused substantive concerns in the policy debate.9
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model.
Section 3 solves for the eﬃcient allocation. Section 4 defines strategies and the subgame
perfect equilibrium and then characterizes equilibrium in terms of the four cases outlined
above. Conclusions are drawn in Section 5.
9In Groenert, Wooders and Zissimos (2009) we delivered a very similar set of results using a diﬀerent
model based on a continuum of firms. This suggests that the results we deliver here are more general than
might be suggested by the specific set-up of our model. The reason for moving to the present simpler
specification is that as a result the details of the key strategic consideration discussed above, which we
regard to be a contribution of the paper, could be brought out more sharply. In addition, the pollution
externality could be modeled in a more satisfactory way in a framework with just four firms than with firms
on a continuum.
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2 The Model
The governments of two countries, a developed country, L (for ‘leader’), and a developing
country, F (for ‘follower’), compete over ES levels and taxes in their attempts to induce firms
to locate in their respective countries. The governments are assumed to be rent maximizers.
There is a set of firms, each of which is able to sell a single unit of a good. The profits of a
firm depend on the level of taxation, the level of the ES, and on the pollution levels of other
firms, in the country where it locates. We will first specify the behavior of firms, and then
we will turn to governments. This is the natural sequence of exposition given that we solve
for equilibrium using backwards induction.
2.1 Firms
Each firm is able to sell its single unit at price p and has a fixed private per-unit production
cost, γ.10 The tax levied on the firm is τL if it locates in L and τF if it locates in F . Let the
variables lL, lF ∈ [0, 1] denote the ES levels in L and F respectively. Let sj ∈ [0, 1] denote
the per-unit-of-output pollution level a given firm j emits in the absence of any ES. There
is an immobile ‘home’ firm in each country, h, for which sh = 1. In addition there are two
mobile firms: the clean firm, c, with pollution level sc; and the dirty firm, d, with pollution
level sd. Let sc ≤ sd < 1, and normalize so that sc = 0.
Firms that are located in the same country impose a nonpositive externality on each
other. In the absence of any ES, the externality that a firm s0 imposes on a firm s depends
on the pollution level of each firm as well as on a parameter k ∈ R+ and is given as follows:
ks0(1− s).
The dirtier the firm s0 the larger the externality imposed on firm s. Moreover, the cleaner
is a firm’s technology, the more damage pollution by another firm does to it.11 The overall
10Prices and costs could be made to vary across firms without aﬀecting the results.
11This assumption captures the idea that one firm’s pollution contaminates the environmental resource
that another firm uses in its production. If, for example, a firm uses water as a cleaning agent in its
production process, and if that water has been polluted, then the firm must clean the water before using it.
The underlying assumption would then be that dirtier water is costlier to clean. Conversely, the production
process of a dirtier firm is less aﬀected by the pollution of other firms. This assumption is consistent with a
wide variety of relatively dirty production processes that do not require a high level of purity in the water
that they use. But it does exclude, for example, the special case of a nuclear power-plant that needs pure
water in its production process but whose pollution is extremely costly for other firms since it turns the
water radioactive.
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impact of the externality is captured by the parameter k; this is what we refer to as mcpe.
The larger is k the larger the negative impact of the pollution by other firms on a firm’s
profit. If the ES level in country i is set at li and the firm locates in country i, the impact
of the externality imposed by s0 on s is reduced to
k (1− li) s0(1− s).
Thus an ES level l requires that a proportion l of the cost of pollution be internalized.12
If there are several polluting firms in a country the negative externalities add up. Let Mi
denote the set of firms that are located in country i ∈ {L, F}. Then the pollution externality
suﬀered by firm j, j ∈ {c, d, h}, can be expressed as
k (1− li)Eji (1− sj),
where Eji =
P
m∈Mi\j sm.
13
Abiding by a certain ES level is costly for firms. Moreover, the dirtier the firm is, the
costlier it is for that firm to abide by the ES. This property is captured in the profit function
by sjli. Thus the profit of firm j that locates in country i is calculated as follows:
π (j) = p− γ − τ i − sjli − k (1− li)Eji (1− sj), i ∈ {L,F} .
To focus the analysis on location decisions, it will be assumed throughout that p is suﬃciently
high to ensure that all firms make nonnegative profits wherever they locate. A firm locates
in the country where its profits are maximized. If a firm’s profits are the same in both
countries we assume that it locates in F .14
Firm j may prefer one country, say F , in terms of the tax that it sets; τF < τL. But if
the environmental standards in L and F and the location of the other firms are such that
sjlF + k (1− lF )EjF (1− sj) > sjlL + k (1− lL)E
j
L(1− sj), firm j may nonetheless prefer to
locate in L. Notice that, all else equal, the clean firm always prefers a higher ES level since
its production technology is already as clean as possible. Moreover, unless the ES is set at
12It is standard to regard an ES as a ceiling on pollution emissions, such as an upper bound on the density
of a particulate in waste water. Our framework fits with this interpretation under the assumption that any
ES level l ∈ (0, 1] imposes a binding constraint on firms d and h but not on firm c and that firm h is required
to reduce its emissions by an amount that is proportionately greater than firm d is.
13Say for example that the clean firm but not the dirty firm locates in country i. Then for the home firm
located in that country, Ehi = sc, while for the clean firm E
c
i = sh.
14This assumption ensures existence of a rent-maximizing strategy among F ’s strategies that attracts
both mobile firms. The same result could be obtained by introducing arbitrarily small indivisibilities in the
strategy sets. For ease of exposition, we chose not to do that.
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the highest level, the clean firm is better oﬀ if the dirty firm locates in the other country.
In contrast, it is costly for the dirty firm to abide by the ES and therefore it prefers higher
ES levels only if k is suﬃciently high. Since sc = 0, the dirty firm is indiﬀerent about the
location of the clean firm and hence is only concerned about the level of the ES because of
its own cost of compliance and the limit that the ES imposes on the externality generated
by the home firm.
2.2 Governments
Rents are given by tax revenues minus the cost of ES-setting. We assume that a government
can vary a tax only for the mobile firms that locate in its country, whereas the home firm
pays a tax or receives a subsidy that is fixed.15 Besides a tax, each government i chooses an
ES level, li, which can take on any value in the unit interval. The pollution levels of firms
located in country i sum to Ei =
P
j∈Mi sj. Then, since the government of i must enforce
the ES on all its firms, its cost of monitoring an ES level, li ∈ [0, 1], is Eili. Thus the cost of
monitoring a given ES is assumed to be proportional to the level of the ES and it is more
costly to monitor the ES for dirtier firms (who have larger incentives to evade the ES).16
Governments move sequentially. Government F observes lL and τL and chooses lF and τF
to maximize its rents.17 Here is the rent function for government F ; the rent function for L
is symmetric:
15The interpretation is that there is a ceiling on the tax (or equivalently, a floor on the subsidy) for the
home firm. This ceiling/floor could be an outcome of a strong lobby of the home firm. Cases in point are
the oil, gas, and coal mining industries whose domestic firms continue to receive subsidies throughout the
EU (Euractiv 2010 and New York Times 2010). In the absence of this assumption, the incentive to use the
tax to extract all profits from the (immobile) home firm may have an overbearing influence on government
incentives.
16We would not expect our results to change qualitatively if the costs of ES setting were strictly convex
instead of linear.
For greater tractability, we have adopted a reduced-form approach to incorporating the ES monitoring
costs. The following structural model of ES monitoring would generate the same cost structure. Suppose
that for each ES level of l a firm j has to decide on the level of pollution reduction ρ ∈ [0, 1] it undertakes at
cost ρsj . The firm has to pay a fine of Max{0, f(l− ρ)} if the government finds that it has violated the ES.
To enforce ρ = l, the government has to choose a probability of monitoring the firm of at least Pr = sj/f .
Thus, firms that have a bigger incentive to pollute need closer and hence more costly monitoring.
17For any of the following variations in the sequence of moves in our model, equilibrium in pure strategies
does not exist: 1) Governments set ESs and taxes simultaneously; 2) L sets an ES level, then, after learning
L’s choice, F sets its ES level, and then, both governments simultaneously set taxes; 3) governments first
simultaneously set ESs and then simultaneously set taxes.
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rF (lF , τF ; lL, τL) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
τF − lF
τF − lF (1 + sd)
2τF − lF (1 + sd)
−lF
if
MF = {c, h}
MF = {d, h}
MF = {c, d, h}
MF = {h}
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
.
The rent function does not include the tax/subsidy for the home firm since it does not play
a role in our analysis. To obtain clear-cut solutions for firm locations, we assume the two
following tie-breaking rules in cases where governments have multiple best-responses: (1) If
indiﬀerent, F chooses sharing strategies within (A) or (B) over the undercutting strategies
(C), and sharing strategies that attract the clean firm (A) over sharing strategies that attract
the dirty firm (B); (2) If L has multiple best responses it chooses the one with the lowest ES
level and so does F if indiﬀerent among strategies within A, B, C, or D. An alternative to
the first assumption would be to introduce indivisibilities into the strategy space, and the
second assumption plays a role only at single points in the parameter space of k and sd.
3 Eﬃciency
We define the eﬃcient outcome to be the one that a social planner would choose if he could
freely choose ES levels (while still having to pay the costs of monitoring) and the allocation of
mobile firms to countries, but not the allocation of the immobile firms. Therefore the eﬃcient
outcome need not respect the incentives of mobile firms to change location.18 The planner
is assumed to maximize the aggregate surplus realized by firms plus the governments’ rents.
In this section, we refer to the two countries with indices 1 and 2 since it does not matter for
the eﬃciency of the allocation which one is F and which one is L. An allocation consists of
two ES levels and an assignment of mobile firms to countries, denoted by (l1, l2,M1). There
are only two types of allocations of firms to consider: 1) The mobile firms are separated; 2)
both mobile firms are allocated to the same country.
(1) Without loss of generality, letM1 = {d, h}. To derive the optimal ES level in country
1 solve
min
l1
{(l1 + sdl1) + k (1− l1) (1− sd) + (1 + sd)l1}.
The first term is the cost of abiding by the ES incurred by the home firm and the dirty firm
in country 1, the second term is the externality that the home firm imposes on the dirty firm,
18The eﬃcient outcome does not change if the planner has to respect mobile firms’ incentives to relocate.
This is because the planner can always set the eﬃcient locating incentives through taxes (which are welfare
neutral).
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and the third term is the ES monitoring cost that the planner incurs. Solving this yields a
critical level of k = 2(1+sd)
1−sd such that: for k ≤
2(1+sd)
1−sd the planner chooses the minimum ES
level, l1 = 0; for k >
2(1+sd)
1−sd the planner chooses the maximum ES level, l1 = 1.
19 To derive
the optimal ES level in country 2, where the clean firm is located, solve
min
l2
{l2 + k (1− l2) + l2}.
The interpretation of the three terms is the same as in the previous equation but for country
2. Solving this for k ≤ 2 yields l2 = 0 and for k > 2 yields l2 = 1.
(2) Without loss of generality, letM1 = {h}. Thus the optimal ES in country 1 is l1 = 0.
To derive the optimal ES level in country 2, solve
min
l2
{(l2 + sdl2) + (k (1− l2) (1 + sd) + k (1− l2) (1− sd)) + (1 + sd)l2}.
Solving this for k ≤ 1 + sd yields l2 = 0 and for k > 1 + sd yields l2 = 1.
Notice that in each of the cases just solved, there exists a critical level of k such that the
optimal ES level is set at minimum if k is below that level and at maximum for higher levels
of k. This critical level of k is smallest in allocation (2), in which the planner allocates both
mobile firms to the same country (so that the benefit of the ES is largest) and is largest if
only the dirty firm is allocated to a country; that is 1 + sd < 2 ≤ 2(1+sd)1−sd .
To decide between separating firms versus locating them in the same country, we compare
the costs resulting from the optimal ES levels in (1) and (2). Results diﬀer depending on
the level of sd. Table 1, in which (le1, le2,Me1 ) denotes the eﬃcient allocation, summarizes our
results; Figure 1 illustrates them.
Table 1: Eﬃcient Outcome
k le1 le2 Me1
k ≤ 2 0 0 {d, h}
k ∈
³
2, 2sd
1−sd
i
(non-empty only if sd > 12) 0 1 {d, h}
k > Max
n
2, 2sd
1−sd
o
0 1 {h}
For k ≤ 2, separation of firms with both countries setting the minimum ES is optimal. For
k > 2, it is optimal to set the minimum ES in one country and the maximum in the other.
If k ∈ (2, 2sd
1−sd ], separation is optimal, with the clean firm located in the country with the
19We select the lowest ES level if there is more than one eﬃcient one.
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maximum ES, while if k > Max
n
2, 2sd
1−sd
o
(or equivalently, sd < sˆd ≡ kk+2 and k > 2), both
mobile firms should be located there. In Figure 1, (x, y) is short for l1 = x and l2 = y. We
say that firms are: ‘Separate’ when one mobile firm is located in each country and, if one
country sets the maximum ES, the clean firm is located there; ‘Together’ when both mobile
firms are located in the country that sets the maximum ES.
 ds
k
(0,0)
Separate
(0,1)
Separate
(0,1)
Together
2
ˆ ( )ds k
Figure 1
The eﬃcient ES levels are weakly increasing in k in the sense that for k ≤ 2 the planner
sets the minimum ES level in both countries while for k > 2 he sets the ES at its maximum
level in one country, maintaining the minimum ES level in the other. If sd is large relative
to k, in which case abiding by the ES is relatively costly for the dirty firm and monitoring
the dirty firm is as well, the dirty firm is most eﬃciently allocated to the country with the
minimum ES. This eﬃcient solution will serve as a benchmark against which to compare the
equilibrium outcome.
4 Competition over Environmental Standards and
Taxes
In this section, our approach will be to first define equilibrium and then state our main
theorem in which equilibrium is characterized. After that, we will provide some intuition for
our results and sketch their derivation. The full proof is presented in the Appendix.
As mentioned above, ES provision and tax setting are modeled as a two-stage game.
Government L sets its ES level and tax and then, observing L’s choices, government F
sets its ES level and tax. Taking government policies as given, firms then make location
decisions to maximize profits. As usual, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is a strategy
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profile with the property that the governments’ strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in
every subgame of the game.
A strategy for government L is a pair consisting of an ES level and a tax. Formally, the
set of strategies is SL = (lL, τL) ∈ [0, 1] × R+. A strategy for government F is a mapping
that assigns a pair, consisting of an ES level and a tax, to each possible strategy choice
made by government L in the first stage of the game. Formally, this mapping is described
by f : SL → [0, 1]× R+ where f (lL, τL) = (lF , τF ). Let F be the set that contains all such
mappings. The set of strategies for government F is SF = F .
We are interested in the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game,
which can be viewed as a Stackelberg game.20
Definition 1. A pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in taxes and ES levels is
a pair of strategies ((l∗L, τ
∗
L), f
∗) such that: (1) (l∗L, τ
∗
L) ∈ SL is a best response to f∗; (2)
f∗ ∈ SF and f∗(lL, τL) is a best response to (lL, τL) for all (lL, τL) ∈ SL.
With the structure of the model in place and equilibrium defined, we are now ready to
state our main theorem which characterizes equilibrium. For use in the theorem and as
illustrated in the following figure, the function s˜d(k) is the boundary between cases a and b
of the theorem, and the function s¯d(k) is the boundary between case (c) and cases (a) and
(d).21 Let M∗F denote the set of firms that locate in F in equilibrium.
Theorem 1. The subgame perfect equilibrium is as follows.
a. (Eﬃcient outcome) If sd ≤ s˜d(k) and k ≤ Min
n
1, 3sd+1
2(1−sd)
o
, both L and F set the
minimum ES level. Firms separate with the cleaner firm locating in F. Specifically, it
holds that l∗L = 0, l
∗
F = 0, τ
∗
F = τ
∗
L + ksd, and M
∗
F = {c, h}. The outcome is eﬃcient.
b. (Pollution haven in F ) If sd > s˜d(k), the diﬀerentiation in ES levels between the two
countries is high; L sets the maximum ES level and F sets the minimum ES level.
Firms separate with the dirty firm locating in F . Specifically, it holds that l∗L = 1,
20It will be assumed throughout that mixed strategies in tax rates are not available to governments. This
is generally deemed to be an acceptable assumption in the applied literature on policy setting in a perfect
information environment.
21The exact expressions for these functions are as follows:
s˜d(k) =
½
1− k
2k
2−2k2+k
if
k ≤ 12
k > 12
; s¯d(k) =
(
2k−1
3(k+1)
k
3(k+1)
if
k ≤ 1
k > 1
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l∗F = 0, τ
∗
F = τ
∗
L + (sd − k + ksd), and M∗F = {d, h}. There is overprovision of the ES
in L.
c. (F undercuts L) If sd < s¯d(k) (which implies k > 12), the diﬀerentiation in ES levels
between the two countries is high; F sets the maximum ES level and L sets the
minimum ES level. Both firms locate together in F . Specifically, it holds that l∗L =
0, l∗F = 1, and τ
∗
F = τ
∗
L − (sd − k + ksd), and M∗F = {c, d, h}. For k ≤ 2 there is
overprovision of the ES and for k > 2 the outcome is eﬃcient.
d. (Pollution haven in L) If sd ≥ s¯d(k) and k > 1, the diﬀerentiation in ES levels between
the two countries is high; F sets the maximum ES level and L sets the minimum ES
level. Firms separate with the clean firm locating in F . Specifically, it holds that
l∗L = 0, l
∗
F = 1, τ
∗
F = τ
∗
L+k(1+ sd), and M
∗
F = {c, h}. For k ≤ 2 there is overprovision
of the ES, and for k > 2 there is underprovision for sd < sˆd(k) and the outcome is
eﬃcient for sd ≥ sˆd(k).
There is always a second-mover advantage, that is rents (and taxes) are higher for F
than for L. Except for if F undercuts L, both governments make positive rents.
 ds
k
a. (0,0) Separate
d. (0,1)
Separate
c. (0,1) Together
1
b. (1,0)
Separate*
1
( )ds k%
( )ds k
ds
k
Efficient
1
Overprovision
        in L
1 2
Overprovision
        in F
Efficient
Efficient
Underprovision
( )ds k%
( )ds k
( )ds k
ˆ ( )ds k
Figure 2
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(Note that the labeling of the cases as a to d in the theorem is unrelated to the follower’s four
strategies, labeled above as A to D.) All results depend on the two key parameters k and
sd as Figure 2 illustrates. The upper panel shows the four (qualitatively diﬀerent) types of
equilibrium; the lower panel shows whether, compared to the eﬃcient outcome, there is too
much (‘Overprovision’) or too little (‘Underprovision’) of the ES. In the figure, ‘Separate’
refers to the case where the clean firm locates in F and the dirty firm locates in L and
‘Separate*’ refers to the reverse case. Subgame perfect ES levels and the locations of firms
diﬀer considerably across the four regions of k and sd. In the lower panel, the function sˆd(k)
separates eﬃciency from underprovision for k > 2.22
The key aspect that drives the results is that L wants to induce F to share firms rather
than undercut. To do so, L has to make it attractive for F to share the firms by giving F
an incentive to incur relatively low costs of monitoring its ES and/or setting its own policy
in such a way that it does not attract the firm from which F would reap higher rents.
In case (a), where k is small and sd is below the threshold value s˜d(k), the externality is not
very important for either of the firms and setting the minimum ES level is a dominant sharing
strategy for F . However, even for relatively low (but still positive) sd the clean firm tries to
avoid locating in the same country as the dirty firm, and this makes its location decision less
elastic with respect to the tax than that of the dirty firm. This relative inelasticity generates
rent that can be extracted from the firm by the government where it locates. To avoid being
undercut L attracts the dirty firm, leaving the clean firm and the associated higher rent to
F .
In case (b), where k is also small but sd is relatively large, L makes sharing an attractive
strategy for F by setting the maximum ES level and attracting the clean firm; this maximum
ES level makes L unattractive to the dirty firm, thereby allowing F to set a high tax and
extract relatively high tax revenue from it. Since the eﬃcient outcome for this parameter
range is that both governments set the minimum ES level, there is overprovision in L.
In cases (c) and (d), in which k is bounded from below, attracting only the clean firm
dominates attracting only the dirty firm for F because the clean firm’s willingness to pay not
to be in the same country as the dirty firm is high relative to the cost of monitoring. Since
k is large, the best way to attract the clean firm is to set the maximum ES level. Given this,
setting the minimum ES level is best for L since this is cheap and further deters the clean
22The exact expression for sˆd(k) is sˆd(k) =
½
0
k
2+k
if
k < 2
k ≥ 2 .
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firm from L. If, as in case (d), sd is above s¯d (k), L is successful at inducing F to attract only
the clean firm. Relative to the eﬃcient outcome, this means that F sets an ineﬃciently high
standard if k ≤ 2. If k > 2 there is ‘underprovision’ of the ES (in the sense that the dirty
firm goes unmonitored and would be more eﬃciently allocated to F , where the ES is set at
the maximum level) for sd below sˆd (k), and the outcome is eﬃcient otherwise. In contrast,
if sd is low, as in case (c), L does not succeed in making sharing firms suﬃciently profitable
for F . Undercutting dominates attracting only the clean firm as the two firms are similar
in their preferences and the maximum ES level eliminates the pollution externality between
them. Relative to the eﬃcient outcome, this means that F sets an ineﬃciently high ES level
for k ≤ 2, while the outcome is eﬃcient for higher levels of k.
The common characteristic of equilibrium across all levels of k and sd is that there is
a second-mover advantage in that F is always able to extract more rents than L. Both
governments make positive rents, except for L in case (c) where sd is relatively low and k
relatively large. The ability to extract rents arises as a result of the monopolistic power that
each government has over location within its country. Each firm must locate in one country
or the other in order to produce, and the government of the country where it does locate is
able to exploit its resultant power when setting taxes. In the following two subsections we
discuss in more detail the strategic considerations of the two countries.
4.1 The Developing Country
The government of the developing country, F , given a strategy (lL, τL) by L, chooses between
four basic strategies: (A) attract the clean firm but not the dirty one, (B) attract the dirty
firm but not the clean one, (C) attract both mobile firms, and (D) do not attract either
of the mobile firms. We show in the Appendix that F never chooses a strategy in D.23 To
find the best-response strategy, we first determine the optimal strategy within each of the
remaining three types of strategies and then compare the payoﬀs from each.
A) To attract only the clean firm, F must choose (lF , τF ) so that if the clean firm locates
in F and the dirty firm locates in L, neither firm has an incentive to move to the other
23The brief argument is as follows. By setting the minimum ES level and a tax suﬃciently high to deter
both mobile firms, L can always ensure nonnegative rents. Therefore, in equilibrium L sets a tax that covers
its costs. For any such strategy, it can be shown that F has a best response that earns it positive rents.
Every strategy in D leads to at most zero rents and is therefore not chosen by F in equilibrium.
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country. Thus we need
τF + k (1− lF ) ≤ τL + k (1− lL) (1 + sd) , and
τL + sdlL + k (1− lL) (1− sd) < τF + sdlF + k (1− lF ) (1− sd) ,
or
τF ∈ (A0, A00]
≡ (τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd) , τL + k (lF + sd − lL(1 + sd))] .
B) Similarly, to attract only the dirty firm, we need
τF ∈ (B0, B00]
≡ (τL + k (lF − lL − sd + lFsd) , τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd)] .
C) And to attract both mobile firms, we need
τF ≤ Min {C 0, C 00}
≡ Min {τL + k (lF − lL − sd + lF sd) , τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd)} .
Define tA ≡ A00, tB ≡ B00 (= A0 = C 00) and tC ≡ C 0 (= B0), which are all linear functions
of lF . Table 2 lists the intercepts, αj, and slopes, βj, of tj, for j ∈ {A,B,C}. These have
natural interpretations that will be discussed below.
Table 2: Boundaries of Strategy Sets
j αj βj
A τL − klL + ksd(1− lL) k
B τL − klL + lLsd(1 + k) k − sd(1 + k)
C τL − klL − ksd k + ksd
It is easy to see that
αC ≤ Min{αA, αB}, where αA < αB ⇔ lL > k
1 + 2k
, and
βB ≤ βA ≤ βC .
Figure 3 depicts the diﬀerent strategy sets for lL ≤ k1+2k (left panel) and lL >
k
1+2k (right
panel). To find the optimal strategy within each subset F chooses a standard level and the
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matching maximum tax in the strategy subset (where, in the figure, this is the tax at the
upper boundary of the respective set). From F ’s rent function we have:
rF (lF , τF ; lL, τL) =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
τF − lF
τF − lF (1 + sd)
2τF − lF (1 + sd)
−lF
if
τF ∈ (tB, tA]
τF ∈ (tC , tB]
τF ≤Min {tC , tB}
else
(A)
(B)
(C)
(D)
.
Two useful observations about the optimal strategy can be made right away from inspection
of the rent function and Figure 3. First, since monitoring an ES level is more costly for
F if it attracts the dirty firm (B) instead of the clean firm (A), and since for lL ≤ k1+2k ,
the maximum tax F can set in A is always at least as high as the one in B (αA ≥ αB and
βA ≥ βB), all strategies in B are dominated. Second, if the maximum tax F can set decreases
in the standard, raising the standard can only decrease F ’s rent. The (lF , τF ) combinations
that are potential best responses, taking into account the two observations just made, are
indicated by bold lines in Figure 3.24
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Taking strategies in B as an example, let us consider the trade-oﬀ F faces when choosing
an ES level. For each of the three kinds of strategies, this trade-oﬀ is captured by the
intercepts αj and slopes βj, for j ∈ {A,B,C}. If F wishes to attract the dirty firm and set
an ES of zero, the maximum tax it can set is αB = τL + sdlL − klL(1− sd). This expression
is composed of the tax in L plus the cost of abiding by the ES that the dirty firm faces in
24Note that although tC lies below tA and (for some lF ) tB, setting tC can potentially yield a higher rent
since it attracts both mobile firms instead of only one.
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L, minus the dirty firm’s cost reduction in L due to the ES there. If F sets a positive ES
level of lF instead, it has to modify the tax by lFβB = lF (k (1− sd)− sd); the dirty firm’s
cost reduction due to the ES, klF (1− sd), minus its cost of abiding by the standard, lFsd.
Similarly, in A, the government of F has to take into account the clean firm’s incentive to
locate in L instead. In C, only one of the mobile firms constitute a binding constraint on the
maximum tax F can set: In the figure, where for low lF the upper boundary of C borders
with B, it is the clean firm whose incentives matter, because it has a strong incentive to
escape the externality from the dirty firm; for large lF the upper boundary of C borders
with A and it is the dirty firm whose incentives matter, because it has a strong incentive to
escape the high cost of abiding by the ES.
To find the rent maximizing ES levels in each of the three cases, F compares the marginal
willingness to pay for the standard of the firms it wishes to attract with its own marginal
cost of monitoring the standard, which is 1 in case A and (1+sd) in B and C. Since a mobile
firm’s marginal willingness to pay increases as the externality becomes more important, the
optimal ES level for each of the three cases is weakly increasing in k. In contrast, the optimal
ES level is weakly decreasing in sd, the degree to which the mobile firms diﬀer.
The last step to find F ’s best response is to compare rents from the optimal strategies in
each of the three cases. Since, for lL ≤ k1+2k , A dominates B it only remains to compare A
and C. Since in C, government F collects the tax twice and the maximum tax it can charge
increases with τL by the same rate in both cases (as can be seen from the intercepts αA and
αC in Table 2), eventually with suﬃciently large τL, the rent-maximizing strategy in C yields
higher rents than the rent-maximizing strategy in A. Thus there is a critical level of L’s tax,
τˆL(lL; k, sd), which we call the sharing tax limit, such that F attracts the clean firm up to
that tax (i.e. it ‘shares’ firms with L) and undercuts if L’s tax exceeds τˆL(lL; k, sd). (This
is not immediate from Figure 3 but will be illustrated in the next subsection). Similarly, if
lL > k1+2k , there is such a sharing tax limit. Up to this tax F shares firms, by attracting
only the clean firm for lower levels of lL and only the dirty firm for higher levels of lL.
4.2 The Developed Country
The government of the developed country, L, can only make positive rents if it can induce F
to share firms. Thus L chooses a tax that does not exceed the sharing tax limit. Since rents
are increasing in taxes L will choose τL = τˆL(lL; k, sd). It only remains to determine the
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optimal ES level. In choosing an ES level, L takes into account two aspects. First, L tries to
find an ES level at which, compared to undercutting, sharing is particularly beneficial for F
so that the sharing tax limit is high. Second, L takes into account the cost of monitoring the
ES. Figure 4 shows the sharing tax limit (the solid line) and the cost of monitoring the ES
(the dashed line) at four diﬀerent combinations of sd and k, one for each of the four diﬀerent
equilibrium outcomes. For L the optimal level of the ES is where the diﬀerence between the
sharing tax limit and monitoring costs is maximized. If τˆL(lL; k, sd) is always at or below its
monitoring cost L cannot make positive rents (as in case c).
The monitoring cost functions are easily understood. Since there is a critical level lˆL
(possibly larger than 1 such as in case c) whereby F attracts the clean firm for lL ≤ lˆL and
the dirty firm for lL > lˆL, monitoring costs up to lˆL are given by (1 + sd)lL and above by lL.
As the figure illustrates, the sharing tax limit varies considerably with parameters k, sd and
lL. In the following, we discuss how this variation comes about and how it leads to the four
diﬀerent types of outcome.
First, suppose that the mcpe is relatively low. To illustrate what happens if sd increases,
keeping k fixed, let us compare case (a) with case (b) in Figure 4. Suppose that L sets a
large ES level to attract the clean firm. For large sd (case b), that is if the dirty firm pollutes
at a high level, F can extract a high tax from the dirty firm since the high ES level in L has
a strong repellent eﬀect on this firm. At the same time, attracting both firms is expensive
for F since the clean firm suﬀers a large negative externality in the presence of the dirty firm
and is tempted by the high ES level in L.25 This leads to a large sharing tax limit for high
levels of lL. In contrast, for small sd (case a), the dirty firm needs bigger tax incentives to
stay in F because the high ES level in L is not very costly for it to abide by, and reduces the
externality from the home firm. At the same time, for low k and sd, there is no strong force
that keeps the two mobile firms apart and attracting both firms is not very costly. Therefore
the sharing tax limit is small for small sd. In summary, if the mcpe is relatively small, a
large ES level pays oﬀ for L if sd is suﬃciently large, but not otherwise.
25This argument only holds if k is not too small, which is why there is the region to the left of the
wedge-shaped region (b) in Figure 2.
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Now suppose that the mcpe is relatively high. The critical level of sd above which it pays
oﬀ for L to attract the clean firm (sˆd in Figure 2) depends on k as well. In particular, for
suﬃciently large k, this critical level is never attained (case d). If L sets a low ES to attract
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the dirty firm, the large k and sd together with this low ES level have a strong repellent
eﬀect on the clean firm so its willingness to pay to locate in F is large. At the same time,
attracting both firms requires the highest ES level (because of the large mcpe), and a low
tax, because the high sd gives the dirty firm a strong incentive to locate in L where the ES
level is low. Thus the sharing tax limit is high at low levels of lL. In contrast, setting a large
ES level to induce F to attract the dirty firm is diﬃcult since for suﬃciently large k even
the dirty firm prefers, all else equal, larger ES levels. So F would set a high ES level as well
and compete with L via taxes. However, if F already sets a high ES level and a competitive
tax, it might just as well in addition attract the clean firm (and since the clean firm does
not need to be monitored, this is not costlier than attracting only the dirty firm). Thus the
sharing tax limit is low at high levels of lL. Overall L is better oﬀ by setting a low ES.
Lastly, for low sd and suﬃciently large k (case c), L cannot make positive rents. This is
because, for F , attracting the clean firm dominates attracting the dirty firm at all levels of
lL. However, attracting the clean firm (by setting the highest ES level) in turn is dominated
by undercutting because, due to the low sd, the government of F can attract the dirty firm as
well without having to lower its tax substantially. As a consequence, L induces undercutting
to avoid negative rents.
5 Relation to the Literature and Conclusions
We began this paper by noting concerns in policy circles that developing countries resembling
those of recent entrants to the EU may, under certain circumstances, have a second-mover
advantage in setting ESs and taxes. We then set out a formal framework which makes precise
a set of circumstances under which such a second-mover advantage may arise. Four possible
predictions were made about the outcome of fiscal competition when the public good in
question is an ES. The particular prediction that emerges in equilibrium depends on the
mcpe and on the diﬀerence between mobile firms in their levels of pollution captured by sd.
The model focuses on the interplay between governments’ incentives to manipulate policy
- ESs and taxes - in order to maximize rents and firms’ incentives to locate where these
policies and the environmental externalities emitted by other firms have the most favorable
impact on their profits.
If the mcpe and sd are both low, then environmental externalities and ESs are not impor-
tant enough to firms for governments to be able to use them strategically. In this case, the
21
forces of tax competition envisaged by Brennan and Buchanan dominate, and the outcome
is eﬃcient. If mcpe is low but sd is relatively high then the possibility of a pollution haven
arises where the dirty firm locates in the developing country in order to escape excessively
high ESs set in the developed country. If mcpe is in an intermediate range then the possi-
bility of overprovision of ESs arises but in this region the roles of the countries are reversed;
the developed country sets no ES at all, putting itself in the position of the pollution haven,
while the developing country does set its ES at a positive level. For relatively high sd in
this range the developed country is successful in attracting one firm, the dirty firm, while
for low sd the developed country is unable to attract any firm. For mcpe at a relatively
high level, the equilibrium configurations do not change from the intermediate range but the
implications for eﬃciency do; underprovision becomes a possibility, as does eﬃciency.
We will now place the paper’s contribution to the literature, starting with the literature
that follows Tiebout (1956) and then moving on to consider the literature that parallels
fiscal federalism and standard tax competition. As in the literature that follows Tiebout,
governments in our model are rent (or profit) maximizing but are constrained by competition.
For example, Fischel (1975) and White (1975) share with the present paper the assumption
that there is variation over firms’ preferences for standards. In keeping with our model, there
are no cross-border externalities. In contrast to our model, Fischel (1975) and White (1975)
both assume that individual firms can be targeted for transfers and there is ‘free entry’ of
jurisdictions, none of which has suﬃcient market power to extract rents from firms. As a
result, within such a setting, an eﬃcient outcome can be demonstrated in which firms ‘vote
with their feet.’ In our model firms cannot be targeted for transfers. There is policy failure
in the sense that once the policies are set they cannot be altered. And there are only two
‘jurisdictions.’ It is interesting to note that none of these diﬀerences in modeling approach
matter for the achievement of eﬃciency providing that themcpe and sd are suﬃciently small.
It is only when themcpe or sd becomes suﬃciently large for governments to compete for firms
using ESs that a divergence from eﬃciency may arise. Given the focus on eﬃcient outcomes
in this first area of the literature and the fact that the focus tends to be on cooperative
frameworks, there is limited scope in such a setting for exploring the type of second-mover
advantage that is our focus in the present paper.
Let us turn now to the second area of the literature on competition over ESs and taxes,
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that parallels the literature on fiscal federalism and ‘standard tax competition.’26 A common
feature across the two areas is that jurisdictions benefit when total tax revenue is larger.
Each jurisdiction attracts tax base by lowering taxes and/or ESs. In this second area of
the literature, as in our model, policy makers cannot target firms for direct transfers. In
contrast to the first area and also in contrast to our model, owners of the mobile resource (i.e.
capital) do not care about ESs and, seeking the highest return, tend to move their capital
away from a jurisdiction if required to foot the bill for an ES. Finally, in this second area
of the literature governments are benevolent and use policy to maximize the welfare of their
citizens, usually including consumers, which contrasts with the first area of the literature
and with our model.
In spite of the diﬀerences between the models in the second area and our model, the
forces of competition between governments can operate in a similar way. This is seen most
clearly by comparing the model of Markusen et al (1995) to ours. Recall that in Markusen
et al (1995), two jurisdictions compete for the plants of a firm using two pollution taxes,
one on domestic production and one on exports. The benchmark situation is one where
the firm locates all its production facilities at home. Yet providing that transport costs are
high enough and plant set-up costs are low enough, the foreign government can undercut
the home government, much as in our model, to get some or all production to locate in
its jurisdiction. The country that hosts the firm at the outset has an incentive to act in
the manner of a limit-pricing monopolist, ‘limit-taxing’ the other country, by setting taxes
just low enough that the firm is indiﬀerent between locating its plants in one country or
two and welfare is the same in both countries. (This eﬀect is brought out most clearly by
Levinson (1997), who rewrites the model of Markusen et al so that the monopoly rents are
earned locally to where a plant locates.) Similarly, in our framework the developing country
engages in limit-taxing by setting a tax just low enough to attract the firm(s) that it wishes
to attract. In equilibrium, at least one firm is just indiﬀerent between locating in the country
that it chooses and moving to the other. Although it appears the basic underlying structure
of the models in the second area of the literature could be adapted to study second-mover
advantage, as far as we are aware this has not been done previously. The standard approach
is to assume that both jurisdictions are ex ante symmetrical, externalities are internalized by
the agents within each jurisdiction, and governments choose policies simultaneously without
26This literature builds on an earlier literature, initiated by Cumberland (1979, 1981), that is concerned
with competition between governments over environmental standards alone.
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communicating, yielding an outcome in which both governments obtain the same payoﬀ in
equilibrium.27
It may be helpful to see the eﬀects that motivate our results by direct comparison to the
broader literature on fiscal competition. We are comparing the role of competition over taxes
and public goods more conventionally defined against the role of competition over taxes and
ESs in an environment where firms exert externalities on one another. The novel feature of
competition in our model is that the developed country is compelled to set its ES and tax in
such a way that it does not induce the developing country to undercut, and that this eﬀect
is strong enough to give the developing country a second-mover advantage. Our aim is to
establish the novelty of this eﬀect through comparison to the rest of the literature.
In a standard model of fiscal competition, Keen and Marchand (1997) consider a set-
ting where the composition of public good provision matters. A jurisdiction can attract
capital by increasing its productivity through a shift in spending from ‘public consumption
goods’ such as parks and art galleries to ‘public investment goods’ such as road and com-
munications networks. In this setting, competition in public good provision, which raises
the return to capital that locates there, works in much the same way as tax competition.
Thus, if the public good-capital complementarity is suﬃciently strong, the equilibrium can
exhibit over-provision of the public good in equilibrium. Although the setting of Keen and
Marchand’s discussion invites a consideration of agglomeration externalities they leave these
forces aside. Focusing on the forces of competition over public goods alone, there seems
no reason to suppose that one jurisdiction or another should derive an advantage from this
kind of competition, and ex ante symmetrical jurisdictions give rise to ex ante symmetrical
outcomes for the respective jurisdictions in this setting.28
Baldwin and Krugman (2004) do focus on agglomeration externalities. In their model,
27Davies and Ellis (2007) do allow for the possibility that externalities between agents within a jurisdiction
are not internalized. They show that in the presence of spillovers binding performance requirements, of
which ESs are a special case, can act as a coordination device for firms. In equilibrium, jurisdictions choose
performance requirements that maximize joint surplus from investment, which tax competition transfers to
firms via tax subsidies. Thus equilibrium is eﬃcient and governments do not make rents.
28Brueckner (2000) considers Tiebout/tax competition in an environment where firms’ public good re-
quirements vary, and shows that firms whose requirements are similar sort themselves eﬃciently across
jurisdictions. The model of the present paper shares the feature of Tiebout-tax competition that there is
variation in firms’ public good requirements. Another common feature is that governments’ objectives are
entirely self-serving in that they are profit/rent maximizing but are constrained by competition. In contrast
to Tiebout/tax competition where there is no policy failure, the policy-failure in our model does allow gov-
ernments to have market power and this underpins the diﬀerence in outcome that eﬃciency is not achieved in
equilibrium. In Brueckner’s work, jurisdictions cannot make rents so in no sense can there be an advantage
from the sequence in which policy decisions are taken.
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scale economies induce economic activity to become concentrated. Competition takes place
over taxes and in equilibrium all of the (mobile) capital locates in only one jurisdiction.
As in our framework, one government leads in policy-setting and the other follows. Like
in Markusen et al, one jurisdiction has all the capital to begin with, and as a result it can
limit-tax the other jurisdiction and keep all the capital for itself. At the same time, since
agglomeration creates rents for firms that can be taxed, the forces of tax competition can lead
to excessive levels of taxation (while in our model taxes are welfare neutral as they simply
transfer rents from firms to the government). Unlike in Markusen et al, the government of
the jurisdiction where all capital locates to begin with can skim oﬀ some of the agglomeration
rents in the form of tax revenue, giving it a first-mover advantage.29
Our model shares similarities with Bucovetsky (2005) as well. He examines an interesting
situation that blends key features of previous models; many jurisdictions may compete for
mobile capital in a setting where agglomeration externalities are important. To focus on
the special features of competition over public investment goods, or ‘public inputs’ as he
refers to them, he abstracts from tax competition entirely. If agglomeration externalities
are suﬃciently strong, the eﬃcient solution has all of the mobile factor locating in one
jurisdiction. Yet competition among jurisdictions can lead to a Nash equilibrium in which
the mobile factor locates across more than one jurisdiction, in contrast to Baldwin and
Krugman and similar to our model. Competition between jurisdictions can lead to over-
provision of the public good as in our model. A nice feature of the model which ours does
not share is that comparative statics can be carried out whereby the economies of scale
can be increased by an increase in the degree of substitutability between the goods that
jurisdictions produce, potentially bringing about a decrease in the number of jurisdictions
that provide public investment goods in equilibrium. Our model is diﬀerent in the specific
mechanism by which ESs are set either excessively high or excessively low. In Bucovetsky
over-provision of the public input arises as jurisdictions fail to take into account the negative
externalities that an increase in the public input inflicts on other jurisdictions. In our model
29Other papers where one jurisdiction is able to limit-tax the other include Black and Hoyt (1989) and
Haufler and Wooton (1999). Kind, Knarvik and Schjelderup (2000) and Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marceau (2004)
study tax competition in the presence of scale economies. Public investment goods do not usually play a
role in such models. An exception is Justman, Thisse and van Ypersele (2002), who investigate the idea that
under fiscal competition regions can segment the market for industrial location by oﬀering infrastructure
services that are diﬀerentiated by quality. They identify a fiscal agglomeration property, which motivates an
asymmetric equilibrium. In these papers, if any government has an advantage in the sequence of play it is
the first-mover.
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there are no such cross-border externalities. Instead, the developing country’s second-mover
advantage leads the developed country to set an ineﬃciently high or low ES to induce less
aggressive competition by the developing country.
Inevitably, the theoretical framework developed here simplifies the situation in a number
of key respects. The most noticeable simplification we have made is that we have not
explicitly treated consumers in our analysis. As mentioned in the Introduction, most of the
prior work on governments’ strategic interactions over ESs has been motivated by a desire
to satisfy consumers, giving rise to the NIMBY phenomenon. A possible direction for future
research would be to integrate our approach with the approach of prior work to examine
the interaction of the two competing forces. One potential limitation to our result is that
in no outcome does the government of the developing country set ESs ‘too low.’ While it
seems reasonable to argue that developed countries may set ESs too high, a concern is that
developing countries actually set their ESs too low from the perspective of consumers. The
introduction of consumers to the model could make it possible for ESs to be set too low in
the developing country.
A potential limitation of our result is that the developing country always sets taxes
higher than the developed country, which is counter-factual particularly to the core European
countries versus the V4 which form our benchmark example (World Bank 1996). In the
Introduction we argued that the developing country would set lower taxes if we changed the
model in such a way that the mobile firms were initially located in the developed country
and had an attachment to home. An alternative approach to reach a similar outcome in a
more nuanced way would be to combine our framework with that of Keen and Marchand
(1997), substituting their competition over public consumption goods with our competition
over ESs. In the new framework the developed country would trade oﬀ competition for firms
by making them more productive using ‘public inputs’ such as roads and communications
networks but requiring them to pay higher taxes, as in Keen and Marchand, against a desire
not to be undercut by the developing country. While higher taxation and public input
provision could be observed in the developed country, a second-mover advantage could be
preserved in the developing country because the latter would not undertake expenditures on
public inputs.
Another direction for future research would be to ask how robust our results would be to
the introduction of a larger number of countries and firms to the model. From our analysis
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it is not obvious how the outcomes would be changed. One conjecture worth investigating
would be that the nth country to move would always have the greatest advantage, with prior
countries being constrained by those that would set policy subsequently.30
Finally, a question that could be addressed in the future is whether incentives exist for
governments to coordinate/harmonize policy within our framework. Under perfect collusion
in our model, governments would simply agree that neither of them would set a positive ES
level and they would set taxes at the level of profits, thereby extracting all surplus. However,
such perfect collusion would require a strong enforcement mechanism and, in the absence
of an international enforcement body, the incentives to break such an agreement might be
overwhelming. This may explain why in practice proposals for collusion have tended to be
weaker, entailing for example the introduction of minimum ESs. A surprising implication
of our framework is that it is not in the interest of the developed country to introduce a
binding minimum ES. The reason is that the developed country benefits from being able to
diﬀerentiate itself from the developing country and putting in place a minimum ES would
limit the scope for doing so. Thus our model presents a possible way of understanding
situations in which minimum ES levels have been called for but none have actually emerged.
This issue appears to warrant further investigation in future research.
30It is tempting to think that one could analyze a model in which a ‘core’ country sets policy first and a
larger number of periphery countries set policy subsequently (but at the same time as each other). However,
the diﬃculty here is that in the present framework in general there may not exist an equilibrium in pure
strategies when countries set policies simultaneously.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Begin with the developing country, F , who has four basic strategies: A) attract only the
clean firm, B) attract only the dirty firm, C) attract both the clean and the dirty firm, and
D) attract neither of the mobile firms.
A) To attract only the clean firm, the following two conditions must hold
τF + k (1− lF ) ≤ τL + k (1− lL) (1 + sd) and
τL + sdlL + k (1− lL) (1− sd) < τF + sdlF + k (1− lF ) (1− sd) ,
from where we get that
τF ∈ (τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd) , τL + k (lF + sd − lL(1 + sd))] .
For this interval to be nonempty we need lF > 2klL+lL−k1+k . Given a standard lF , the follower
would always set the highest possible tax. Thus the optimal standard level depends on the
sign of
∂ (τF − lF )
∂lF
=
∂ (τL + k (lF + sd − lL(1 + sd))− lF )
∂lF
= k − 1,
and therefore, if k ≤ 1, lF = Max{0, 2klL+lL−k1+k } and if k > 1 then lF = 1 (but for that
we need lL < 1). Note that at k = 1, the follower is indiﬀerent across all ES levels. By
assumption, he chooses the lowest one. This is the same for the following cases.
B) Similarly, to attract only the dirty firm, we need
τF ∈ (τL + k (lF − lL − sd + lFsd) , τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd)] .
For this interval to be nonempty we need lF < klL+lL+k1+2k . The optimal standard level depends
on the sign of
∂ (τF − lF )
∂lF
=
∂ (τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd)− (1 + sd)lF )
∂lF
= −2sd + k (1− sd)− 1,
and therefore, if k ≤ 1+2sd
1−sd , then lF = 0, and if k >
1+2sd
1−sd , then lF =
klL+lL+k
1+2k .
28
C) To attract both mobile firms, we need
τF ≤ Min
©
τ 1F , τ
2
F
ª
≡ Min {τL + k (lF − lL − sd + lF sd) , τL + (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd)} .
We have τ 1F ≤ τ 2F ⇔ lF ≤ klL+lL+k1+2k . Given a standard lF , the optimal tax is τF =
Min {τ 1F , τ 2F}.
Case 1: lF ≤ klL+lL+k1+2k
∂ (2 ∗ τ 1F − (1 + sd)lF )
∂lF
=
∂ (2τL + 2k (lF − lL − sd + lFsd)− (1 + sd)lF )
∂lF
= 2k (1 + sd)− (1 + sd),
and therefore, if k ≤ 1
2
, then lF = 0, and if k > 12 , then lF =
klL+lL+k
1+2k .
Case 2: lF ≥ klL+lL+k1+2k
∂ (2 ∗ τ 2F − (1 + sd)lF )
∂lF
=
∂ (2τL + 2 (lL − lF ) (sd − k + ksd)− (1 + sd)lF )
∂lF
= −3sd − 1 + 2k (1− sd) ,
and therefore, if k ≤ 1+3sd
2(1−sd) , then lF =
klL+lL+k
1+2k , and if k >
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , then lF = 1. Putting the
two cases together we obtain
lF = 0 and τ 1F if k ≤
1
2
,
lF =
klL + lL + k
1 + 2k
and τ 1F = τ
2
F if k ∈
µ
1
2
,
1 + 3sd
2(1− sd)
¸
, and
lF = 1 and τ 2F if k >
1 + 3sd
2(1− sd)
.
D) By setting a suﬃciently high tax, F deters both mobile firms, earning zero rents.
This never happens in equilibrium as the following argument shows. Note that rents in C
are higher than in A or B for suﬃciently large τL (the maximum taxes in A, B, and C
increase by the same rate in τL and in C this tax is collected twice). Thus L can always
induce C and make zero rents. Therefore, in equilibrium, L sets a tax that covers the costs
of monitoring the standard. It is easy to show that for any τL suﬃciently large to do that,
F has at least one strategy (in A, B, or C) that makes positive rents, showing that F never
chooses D.
The next step is to compare F ’s rents across A, B, and C. According to the results
so far, there are five diﬀerent ranges of k to consider: If sd < 15 , these are I) k ≤
1
2
, II)
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k ∈
³
1
2
, 1+3sd
2(1−sd)
i
, III) k ∈
³
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
i
, IV) k ∈
³
1, 1+2sd
1−sd
i
, and V) k > 1+2sd
1−sd , and if sd ≥
1
5
,
these are I’) k ≤ 1
2
, II’) k ∈
¡
1
2
, 1
¤
, III’) k ∈
³
1, 1+3sd
2(1−sd)
i
, IV’) k ∈
³
1+3sd
2(1−sd) ,
1+2sd
1−sd
i
, and V’)
k > 1+2sd
1−sd .
I and I’) k ≤ 1
2
. Rents in each case are.
rA =
½
τL + k (sd − lL(1 + sd))
τL + k
¡
2klL+lL−k
1+k + sd − lL(1 + sd)
¢
− 2klL+lL−k
1+k
if lL < k2k+1
if lL ≥ k2k+1
,
rB = τL + lL (sd − k + ksd) , and
rC = 2τL − 2k (lL + sd) .
For lL ≤ k2k+1 , we have rA ≥ rB and for lL >
k
2k+1 we have rB > rA (if rA = rB, F chooses
A by assumption). Next, compare rA with rC for lL ≤ k2k+1 and rB with rC for lL >
k
2k+1 .
This comparison yields
rA ≥ rC ⇔ τL ≤ k (lL + 3sd − lLsd) , and
rB ≥ rC ⇔ τL ≤ klL + 2ksd + lLsd + klLsd.
Thus, for each case there is a sharing tax limit, an upper bound on the tax the leader can
set without having the follower ‘undercut’ him. We denote this limit by τˆL (lL; k, sd).
For the remaining ranges of k, the derivation is as in (I and I’), so we omit the details:
II and II’) k ∈
³
1
2
,Min
n
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
oi
. The sharing tax limit in this range of k is given
by τˆL (lL; k, sd) =½
(2k + 1)−1 (k + lL + 4ksd + lLsd − 2klLsd − 2k2 + 4k2sd − 4k2lLsd)
(2k + 1)−1 (k + lL + 3ksd + 2lLsd + 2klLsd − 2k2 + 2k2sd)
if
lL ≤ k2k+1
lL > k2k+1
.
III) k ∈
³
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
i
. Here, τˆL (lL; k, sd) =½
3sd − 2k + klL + 3ksd − 2lLsd − 3klLsd + 1
3sd − 2k + klL + 2ksd − lLsd − klLsd + 1
if
lL ≤ k2k+1
lL > k2k+1
.
III’) k ∈
³
1, 1+3sd
2(1−sd)
i
. Here, τˆL (lL; k, sd) =½
− (2k + 1)−1 (2klLsd − 4ksd − lLsd − lL − 4k2sd + 4k2lLsd + 1)
(2k + 1)−1 (k + lL + 3ksd + 2lLsd + 2klLsd − 2k2 + 2k2sd)
if
lL ≤ −1+k+ksdsd(1+2k)
lL > −1+k+ksdsd(1+2k)
.
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IV and IV’) k ∈
³
Max
n
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
o
, 1+2sd
1−sd
i
. Here, τˆL (lL; k, sd) =½
− (k − 3sd − klL − 3ksd + 2lLsd + 3klLsd)
3sd − 2k + klL + 2ksd − lLsd − klLsd + 1
if
lL ≤ −1+k+ksdsd(1+2k)
lL > −1+k+ksdsd(1+2k)
.
V) and V’) k > 1+2sd
1−sd . In this range of k, we have rA > rB for all lL < 1 and the sharing
tax limit is given by τˆL (lL; k, sd) =
− (k − 3sd − klL − 3ksd + 2lLsd + 3klLsd) .
Here, if lL = 1, then A is not feasible for F . Thus for lL = 1 we compare rB with rC,
which yields τˆL (lL; k, sd) = 0. We can ignore this case in the following since we have already
established that L makes at least zero rents.
Now consider the developed country, L. Since F ’s optimal response depends on the value
of k, we need to consider L’s problem for each of the cases I-IV (I’-V’). To make positive
rents L tries to induce F to choose a strategy in A or B. The maximum tax L can set at
a given ES level is the corresponding sharing tax limit. It only remains to determine L’s
optimal ES level. Except for V and V’, the sharing tax limit has one discontinuity, where F
switches from A to B. We derive the optimal ES level in three steps. First determine, what
are the optimal ES levels to induce A and to induce B, second, compare rents at these levels,
and third determine when L’s rents are negative. In this case, L induces C by setting lL = 0
and some tax τL above the corresponding sharing tax limit.
I and I’) k ≤ 1
2
.
(i) lL ≤ k2k+1 . To determine the optimal ES level, consider the sign of
∂ (τˆL (lL; k, sd)− (1 + sd)lL)
∂lL
=
∂ (k (lL + 3sd − lLsd)− (1 + sd)lL)
∂lL
= k − sd − ksd − 1.
Thus, conditional on lL ≤ k2k+1 and in the relevant range of k, the leader sets lL = 0.
(ii) lL > k2k+1 . Consider the sign of
∂ (τˆL (lL; k, sd)− lL)
∂lL
=
∂ (klL + 2ksd + lLsd + klLsd − lL)
∂lL
= k + sd + ksd − 1.
Thus, conditional on lL > k2k+1 and k ≤
1−sd
1+sd
the leader sets lL = k2k+1 , and if k >
1−sd
1+sd
the
leader sets lL = 1. (We ignore for the moment that lL = k2k+1 is not in the relevant interval for
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lL. This does not play a role because when comparing rents in (i) and (ii) lL = k2k+1 is never
chosen even though, for any ε > 0, it yields slightly higher rents than setting lL = k2k+1 + ε).
If indiﬀerent, L chooses the lower ES level by assumption.
Comparing rents in (i) and (ii) yields that for k ≤ 1 − sd, the leader induces A, and
otherwise B. We obtain
If k ≤ 1− sd,
l∗L = 0, τ
∗
L = 3ksd and l
∗
F = 0, τ
∗
F = 4ksd.
If k > 1− sd,
l∗L = 1, τ
∗
L = k + 3ksd + sd and l
∗
F = 0, τ
∗
F = 4ksd + 2sd.
For the remaining ranges of k, the derivation is as in (I and I’), so we omit the details:
II and II’) k ∈
³
1
2
,Min
n
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
oi
. We obtain
If k <
1
4
s−1d
µ
sd +
q
16s2d + (2− sd)
2 − 2
¶
,
l∗L = 1, τ
∗
L = (2k + 1)
−1 ¡k + 1 + 5ksd + 2sd − 2k2 + 2k2sd¢ , and
l∗F = 0, τ
∗
F = (2k + 1)
−1 ¡k + 1 + 5ksd + 2sd − 2k2 + 2k2sd¢+ (sd − k + ksd) .
If k ≥ 1
4
s−1d
µ
sd +
q
16s2d + (2− sd)
2 − 2
¶
,
l∗L = 0, τL = (2k + 1)
−1 ¡k + 4ksd − 2k2 + 4k2sd¢ , and
l∗F = 0, τF = (2k + 1)
−1 ¡k + 4ksd − 2k2 + 4k2sd¢+ ksd.
III) k ∈
³
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
i
. We obtain
l∗L = 0, τ
∗
L = 3sd − 2k + 3ksd + 1, and
l∗F = 0, τ
∗
F = 3sd − 2k + 3ksd + 1 + ksd.
III’) k ∈
³
1, 1+3sd
2(1−sd)
i
. We obtain
l∗L = 0, τ
∗
L = (2k + 1)
−1 ¡4ksd + 4k2sd − 1¢ , and
l∗F = 1, τ
∗
F = (2k + 1)
−1 ¡4ksd + 4k2sd − 1¢+ k (1 + sd) .
IV and IV’) k ∈
³
Max
n
1+3sd
2(1−sd) , 1
o
, 1+2sd
1−sd
i
. We obtain
l∗L = 0, τ
∗
L = 3sd + 3ksd − k
l∗F = 1, τ
∗
F = 3sd + 4ksd.
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V) and V’) k > 1+2sd
1−sd
Consider the sign of
∂ (τˆL (lL; k, sd)− (1 + sd)lL)
∂lL
= k − 3sd − 3ksd − 1.
Therefore if sd ≥ 13 or if k ≤
1+3sd
1−3sd (only possible if sd <
1
3
) the leader sets lL = 0 and if
sd < 13 and k >
1+3sd
1−3sd the leader sets lL = 1 (however, for lL = 1, A is not feasible for F ,
but this does not matter since we have already excluded this case). We obtain (for now and
ignoring the problem at lL = 1)
If sd ≥
1
3
or if k ≤ 1 + 3sd
1− 3sd
,
l∗L = 0, τ
∗
L = 3sd + 3ksd − k and l∗F = 1, τ∗F = 3sd + 4ksd.
If sd <
1
3
and k >
1 + 3sd
1− 3sd
,
l∗L = 1, τ
∗
L = sd and l
∗
F = 1, τ
∗
F = sd.
If L’s rents are negative, it is better oﬀ setting lL = 0 and a ‘deterring tax’ of τdL >
τˆL (0; k, sd) to induce F to undercut, thereby ensuring zero rents. This happens if k ≤ 1 and
sd < 2k−13(k+1) and if k > 1 and sd <
k
3(k+1) . In these cases F ’s best response is to set lF = 1
and τF = τdL − (sd − k + ksd).
Given these equilibrium strategies, it is straightforward to verify that there is always a
second-mover advantage. ¤
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